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The Institutional Framework for Doing Sports Business: 
Principles of EU Competition Policy in Sports Markets 
Oliver Budzinski#
Abstract: The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents an 
important institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the courts, the 2007 
overhaul of the approach and methodology has increased the scope of competition policy 
towards sports associations and clubs. Nowadays, virtually all activities of sports associations 
that govern and organize a sports discipline with business elements are subject to antitrust 
rules. This includes genuine sporting rules that are essential for a league, championship or 
tournament to come into existence. Of course, ‘real’ business or commercial activities like 
ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting rights, etc. also have to comply with competition 
rules. 
Regulatory activities of sports associations comply with European competition rules if they 
pursuit a legitimate objective, its restrictive effects are inherent to that objective and 
proportionate to it. This new approach offers important orientation for the strategy choice of 
sports associations, clubs and related enterprises. Since this assessment is done following a 
case-by-case approach, however, neither a blacklist of anticompetitive nor a whitelist of 
procompetitive sporting rules can be derived. Instead, conclusions can be drawn only from the 
existing case decisions – but, unfortunately, this leaves many aspects open. With respect to 
business activities, the focus of European competition policy is on centralized marketing 
arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute cartels and are viewed to be 
anticompetitive in nature. However, they may be exempted from the cartel prohibition on 
efficiency and consumer benefits considerations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that 
centralized marketing arrangements must comply with in order to be legal. Although this 
policy seems to be well-developed at first sight, a closer look at the decision practice reveals 
several open problems. Other areas of the buying and selling behavior of sports associations 
and related enterprises are considerably less well-developed and do not provide much 
orientation for business. 
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1. Introduction 
The increasing commercialization of sports has turned (at least) professional sports more and 
more into a business. With the increasing weight of economic activities in the context of 
sport, however, the sports ‘industry’ came under the jurisdiction of competition rules. 
Although many sports clubs and associations do not view themselves to be business 
companies, it has long been established in legal sciences that economic activities in the 
context of sport do fall within the scope of EC competition rules and law (European
Commission 2007b: 63). This represents long-standing practice and is confirmed by the 
European Courts.1 Similarly, the question whether individual athletes, sports clubs, national 
and international sports association are undertakings or enterprises in the sense of EC law has 
been comprehensively answered in the affirmative as soon as they pursue economic activities 
in the broadest sense and irrespective of any formal status of professional vs. amateur sports 
(European Commission 2007b: 66-67).
Competition rules shape the strategic behavior of sports clubs and associations when it comes 
to economic activities (in a broad understanding), defining what types of business behavior is 
allowed and what not. Thus, compliance with competition rules as a considerable part of the 
institutional framework for doing business represents an important element for and constraint 
on strategy development and choice. Therefore, it is relevant for sports business to understand 
the underlying principles and policy practices of European competition authorities, so that 
strategy and management can be shaped in compliance with competition rules. This requires 
specialized research because the sports sector differs significantly from other, more ‘ordinary’ 
industries (Smith & Stewart 2010; Dietl 2010) – and this is recognized by the relevant 
competition authorities in Europe. Consequently, the European Commission (EC) – in its 
Directorate-Generals Competition and Education & Culture – has developed a sector-specific 
interpretation and application of the general competition rules of the European Union. This 
policy also influences the policy of the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) that (i) 
directly apply EU law to national cases and (ii) are bringing the execution of national 
competition rules in line with EC policy through the European Competition Network (ECN) 
(Budzinski & Christiansen 2005). 
Unlike the U.S., where antitrust policy in sport business represents a frequently discussed 
issue2, there is comparatively little literature on competition policy interventions into sports 
markets in Europe. Furthermore, the existing discussion is predominantly driven by legal 
sciences and lacks a sports management perspective. This is particularly true with regard to 
2007-overhaul of the sector-specific attitude to applying competition rules in sports.3 The 

1 Relevant decisions date back to the 1970s and the famous Bosman judgment (1995) also plays an important 
role. See for the most recent confirmation the judgment of the CFI in the Meca-Medina case. Naturally, the 
same applies for other business rules under EC law such as the internal market and free movement rules. 
2 See Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Pelnar 2007; DePasquale 2009; Kahn 2009; Keyte & Eckles 2009; Loptaka
2009; Winfree 2009; Zimbalist 2009; Feldman 2010; Grow 2010; Hovenkamp 2010; Rascher 2010 for a 
selection of recent contributions. 
3 See Robertson 2002; Papaloukas 2005; Santa Maria 2005; Weatherill 2006, 2007; Cygan 2007a, 2007b; 
Massey 2007; Szyszczak 2007 for legal analyses, however, predominantly referring to the pre-2007 White 
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paper systematically outlines the underlying principles and practices of EC competition policy 
in the sports sector, thus, providing important information and orientation for sports 
management (section 2). It illustrates this by discussing two major cases and its implications 
for sports business and points to open problems and some inconsistencies in the application of 
competition rules to sports (section 3). In doing so, the paper contributes to filling a gap in the 
sports management literature. 
2. European Competition Rules for Sports Business 
2.1 European Competition Rules and Case Overview 
European competition policy in the broad sense consists of the competition provisions and 
policies on the community level (European competition policy in the narrow sense) and the 
ones on the level of the Member States (national competition policy). The community level 
provides rules for enterprise cooperation (cartel policy), abusive strategies of enterprises with 
a powerful market position (abuse control), mergers and acquisitions (merger control) and 
public subsidies for enterprises (state aid policy). Without going into detail,4
- cartel policy (Art. 101 TFEU5) generally prohibits any agreement between 
independent enterprises, especially the coordination of prices and quantities, the 
division of markets as well as discriminatory and boycott arrangements, unless the 
enterprise cooperation cumulatively fulfills five criteria: (i) increases efficiency of 
production or distribution, (ii) promotes technical or economic progress, (iii) allows 
consumers a fair share of the benefits, (iv) imposes no unnecessary restrictions on 
competition (= the benefits must be cartel-specific) and (v) does not eliminate 
competition in a substantial part of the products in question, 
- abuse control (Art. 102 TFEU6) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in any 
market, 
- merger control (Art. 2 (2) ECMR7) prohibits mergers and acquisitions that lead to a 
significant impediment of effective competition, and 
- state aid policy (Art. 107 ff. TFEU) generally prohibits distortive aids for enterprises 
by national or regional governments or governmental organizations. 

Paper policy. To my best knowledge, the existing economic literature on European antitrust issues (see, inter 
alia, Ross 2003; Syzmanski 2010; Budzinski & Satzer 2011 and the literature cited therein; Lyons 2009) does 
not explicitly deal with the post-2007 EC competition policy. 
4 For a contemporary and comprehensive analysis see for instance Bishop & Walker (2010). 
5 Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union  
 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF;
 retrieved 2010-12-06 at 16.01); formerly Art. 81 EC. 
6 Formerly Art. 82 EC. 
7 European Commission Merger Regulation  
 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:024:0001:0022:EN:PDF;  
 retrieved 2010-12-06 at 16.17). 
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Out of these policy fields, only merger policy has not yet been a relevant problem in the sport 
sector. Therefore, there is no special Commission policy on sports mergers so far.8 According 
to the Commission website9, most cases have been handled under EU antitrust rules, which 
comprises cartel policy and abuse control. Thus, this article will accordingly focus on these 
policy areas. 
The competition rules in the Member States can differ considerably from the community rules 
and – to put it very simplified10 – apply to cases that are purely national or regional. If the 
community rules are applicable, however, national decisions must stand in line with European 
competition policy in the narrow sense. National cases do have some importance in the sports 
industry. However, due to the large variety in 27 Member States and due to space restrictions, 
this article cannot include them systematically. Thus, it will concentrate on European 
competition policy in the narrow sense. 
The appendix provides an overview over the competition cases handled by the Commission. 
The early cases have often been based on internal market rules with the notable exceptions of 
the landmark Formula One case (see section 3.2) and centralized marketing cases (see section 
3.3). Since the 2007 Meca-Medina ruling, however, virtually all areas of sports business have 
become directly subject to competition rules, including apparently genuine sporting activities 
like defining, developing and enforcing the regulatory framework of a sports discipline’s 
major championships, leagues and tournaments (see sections 2.2 and 3.1). Although the sheer 
case number does not seem to be too overwhelming, the Commission, on its website, cites 
sports business as one among only 13 industries that deserve special antitrust attention.11
The antitrust cases within the sports sector can be classified into three categories: 
(I) the internal regulation of sport (genuine sporting rules or the rules of the game), 
(II) business practices (buying and selling behavior of sports enterprises, like ticketing 
arrangements, exclusivity contracts, etc), and 

8 The appendix lists the EU case history. Most of the hitherto mergers concerned private equity companies 
acquiring commercial rights holders of sports event. Only one concentration – the CVC-SLEC merger – 
raised anticompetitive concerns as so far it was about to merge the commercial rights of the biggest four-
wheel motor racing world championship with the biggest two-wheel one. A divestiture commitment to sell 
the motor cycling rights solved the issue (European Commission 2006). Furthermore, mergers between sports 
clubs have not occurred frequently in a professional or business context so far (perhaps with the exception of 
the Superligaen, the Danish premier football league) and mergers between sports associations have merely 
occurred on a national level without community dimension so far. It is somewhat likely, however, that 
merger policy will gain importance in the sports sector with the ongoing commercialization of sports 
business. 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html; retrieved 2010-12-06 at 16.09). 
10 For a more comprehensive analysis of the complex competence delineation and allocation rules see for 
instance Budzinski (2006). 
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/overview_en.html. 
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(III) the sale of broadcasting rights12 (in particular the practice of bundling and joint-selling of 
the rights and the centralized marketing of a league or a championship). 
2.2 Principles of EU Competition Policy towards Sports Business  
The principles of EU competition policy in sports markets have been outlined in the context 
of the 2007 White Paper on Sport (European Commission 2007a) by the accompanying staff 
paper on the background and context of the Commission policy in the sports sector (European 
Commission 2007b). Although this paper aims to provide guidance for sports business 
(addressing both sports associations and sports clubs) it does not constitute official 
competition policy guidelines (European Commission 2007b: 63), i.e. it does not possess a 
binding character for Commission decisions. Thus, it falls short of being a sports-specific 
interpretation of competition law and merely represents a policy notice. However, it can be 
expected that the Commission will actually practice according to the outlined concepts and 
procedures.
2.2.1. Taking Account of the Special Characteristics of Sport
The Commission acknowledges that sports business entails several special characteristics 
distinguishing this industry and the related markets from ‘ordinary business’ (Lindström-Rossi
et al. 2005: 74-75; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6-7). Explicitly, four specificities of sport are 
enlisted (ibid.).
Firstly, the interdependence between competing adversaries refers to the basic sports 
economic insight that the competitors in any league or championship depend on each other in 
order to achieve a viable business. In stark contrast to ‘ordinary’ industries “where 
competition serves the purpose of eliminating inefficient firms from the market, sport clubs 
and athletes have a direct interest (..) in there being other clubs and athletes” (Kienapfel & 
Stein 2007: 6). Any league or championship requires a sufficient number of entries 
(competitors) for a sustainable existence. 
Secondly, the need to preserve the uncertainty of results somewhat mixes two different 
principles.  On the one hand, it includes the ‘integrity of competition’, a principle that is 
related to the absence of match-fixing, doping, etc. (Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005: 74). On the 
other hand, the ‘uncertainty of outcome’ principle (following the similarly named famous 
hypothesis from sports economics; Neale 1964), leads to the “requirement of a certain degree 
of equality or, in other words, competitive balance” (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 6).13 In contrast 

12 Systematically, the sale of broadcasting rights would belong to the selling behavior of sports enterprises and, 
thus, to the business practices category. However, due to the outstanding volumes and importance of this 
business for some sports, the Commission treats these cases as a separate category. 
13 Already the founding father of sports economics as a discipline, Rottenberg (1956: 242), claimed that the 
“nature of the industry is such that competitors must be of approximate equal ‘size’ if any are to be 
successful; this seems to be a unique attribute of professional competitive sports” as well as “no team can be 
successful unless its competitors also survive and prosper sufficiently so that the differences in the quality of 
the play among teams are not ‘too great’”. However, modern sports economic insight takes a more cautious 
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to the basic interdependence between competitors, i.e. the existence of a sufficient number of 
competitors, competitive balance refers to a sufficient sporting and economic viability of the 
competitors in order to create a close and sustainable fight for wins and championships. 
Thirdly, the freedom of internal organization of sport associations is highlighted. Sport is 
typically organized by a ‘monopolistic pyramid structure’, i.e. “a single national sport 
association per sport and Member State, which operates under the umbrella of a single 
European and a single worldwide federation” (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 7). It is not completely 
clear, however, whether – by referring to the ‘often required existence of one umbrella 
organization’ – this specificity represents an analogue to the American notion of the ‘single-
entity cooperation’, i.e. cooperative actions that are essential and indispensable for the pure 
(sporting) existence of a league or championship. If it is meant to highlight the essential 
regulatory task of sports associations, setting the rules of a game, then a more specific or 
narrower definition of the monopolistic bottleneck within the organization of sports business 
would be required. While both the concepts of the single-entity cooperation and the regulatory 
minimum tasks drive the conclusion of a monopoly of regulatory power in a given league or 
championship, these concepts do not automatically preclude the necessary absence of rival 
leagues or championships (under the same ‘umbrella’ or under different ‘umbrellas’), for 
instance. The FIA case (section 3.2) provides ample indication of the problems of a lack of 
clarity in this issue. 
Fourthly, preserving the educational, public health, social, cultural and recreational 
functions of sport, the ‘principle of solidarity’, represents a somewhat non-economic 
community objective. Furthermore, it remains rather unclear what concrete implications must 
be derived from the inclusion of this principle apart from sports ‘requiring’ a certain degree of 
arrangements which provide for  redistribution of financial resources from professional to 
amateur and youth levels of sport (Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005: 75; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 
6-7).
2.2.2. Genuine Sporting Rules, Business Activities and Competitive Effects 
From the special characteristics of sports, namely from the single-entity cooperation concept 
and the essential regulatory task of sports associations, it can be inferred that the activities of 
sports associations can be distinguished in setting and implementing genuine sporting rules
and conducting business activities. Conceptually, genuine sporting rules would refer to the 
rules of the game, the schedule and structure of the championship and other activities 
(including the enforcement of the rules) that are essential to generate a sportingly viable 
league or championship. Examples include the length of the game, the number of players, the 
design of the off-side rule, sanctioning rule violators, etc. in European football. These 
activities can be viewed as being non-business in nature and purely sporting. In contrast, 

approach: “It is simply not the case that competitive balance is either necessary or sufficient to increase the 
popularity of a sport” (Szymanski 2006: 31). 
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activities like bundling and selling broadcasting rights, market a league or championship 
product, ticketing arrangements, contracts with equipment suppliers, etc. are not essential for 
a league or championship to come into existence and represent business activities. Following 
this distinction, a manifest policy consequence would be to apply (economic) competition 
rules only to business activities and generally exempt genuine sporting rules. In the times 
before the landmark Meca-Medina ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006, the 
Commission and the European courts appear to have embraced this conceptual differentiation 
(Lindström-Rossi et al. 2005). 
However, there is an obvious problem with the non-business character of genuine sporting 
rules. Sports associations can shape these rules with a view to increase the attractiveness of 
the sport in order to maximize fan numbers (and revenues) and, thus, pursue a business 
motivation with the design of the sporting rules, generating economic effects. While in some 
cases it might rather clear that a rule change or the introduction of a new rule serves the 
business interest rather than the sport, it is practically impossible to draw a strict delineation 
between genuine sporting rules and business activities.14 The ECJ implicitly embraced this 
insight in Meca-Medina. Two professional long-distance swimmers challenged the anti-
doping rules of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) under articles 81 and 82 EC (now 
101 and 102 TFEU). By setting too low threshold for the relevant substances and handing out 
excessive penalties for violations, the IOC was alleged to restrict competition and abusing its 
monopoly power. While the ECJ rejected the complaint in question, it took the opportunity of 
this judgement to rule that there is no category of purely sporting rules that are a priori not 
subject to the application of competition rules. Instead, the court clarified that if the 
underlying sporting activity constitutes an economic activity (i.e. includes business elements), 
then the conditions for participation also fall within the scope of European competition 
rules.15 As a consequence, the following three-step methodology to apply Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU to sports business has been developed (European Commission 2007b: 65-69; 
Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 8). 
Step 1: Are Articles 101 and 102 TFEU applicable to the sporting rule? This requires that 
(1a) the rule-setting sports association is either an undertaking or an association of 
undertakings, (1b) the rule in question either restricts competition (Art. 101 (1) TFEU) or 
constitutes an abuse of a dominant position (Art. 102 TFEU), and (1c) that trade between the 
Member States is affected. 
Step 1 probably represents the easiest part of the assessment due to the special characteristics 
of sports business (see section 2.2.1). A governing sports association falls under the legal 
undertaking or enterprise concept (1a) as soon as the regulated sports discipline (or the 
regulated league, championship or tournament) includes business elements (some types of 

14 For instance, it is undoubtedly essential to define the length of a match (in football, etc.). However, making 
the match lasting longer or shorter, playing gross or net time or the number, frequency and scheduling of 
breaks might well be decided and shaped according to the attractiveness for television broadcasting and, thus, 
according to business interests. Think about the introduction of extra breaks for commercials, for instance. 
15 On Meca-Medina and its line of reasoning see Weatherill (2006, 2007), European Commission (2007b), 
Kienapfel & Stein (2007) and Szyszczak (2007). 
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money flows). Apart from very amateur sports, this will be the case for virtually all sports 
events, especially of course for premier-level sports as well as other professional and semi-
professional sports. Virtually all rules defined and enforced by any sports association in its 
essential function as a regulatory, governing body will influence the comparative 
competitiveness of the participants, the conditions of participation or other elements of 
competition and, in this regard, (potentially) ‘restrict’ competition in one way or the other 
(1b). In this regard, sporting competition and economic competition are inextricably 
intertwined in sports business since the essential regulation of sports events inevitably 
influences their attractiveness and, thus, includes a business dimension. Due to the 
monopolistic pyramid structure of sports associations (see section 2.2.1), a dominant position 
should always be easy to establish.16 Eventually, the geographic jurisdictional criterion (1c) 
determines the competence allocation between the Commission and the Member States. 
Step 2: Does the sporting rule infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU? The sporting rule falls 
outside the prohibition of these provisions if (2a) the rule pursues a legitimate objective, (2b) 
its restrictive effects are inherent in the pursuit of that objective, and (2c) proportionate to it. 
“[A]nticompetitive sporting rules which are inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of 
sport and proportionate do not infringe Articles 81 (1) or 82 EC (...)” (European Commission
2007b: 63). Legitimate objectives (2a) usually relate to the organisation and proper conduct 
of competitive sport. This may include (European Commission 2007b: 68) ensuring fair sport 
competitions with equal chances for all athletes, ensuring the uncertainty of results by the 
absence of match-fixing, the protection of the athletes’ health, protecting the safety of the 
spectators, the encouragement of training of young athletes, ensuring of financial stability of 
sport clubs/teams, the rules of the game (ensuring uniform and consistent exercise of a given 
sport), etc. This list is not meant to be complete. It just provides some typical examples. 
“The restrictions caused by a sporting rule must be inherent in the pursuit of its objective” 
(2b) (European Commission 2007b: 68). It remains rather unclear whether this condition is 
already satisfied if a sporting rule is suited to achieve the legitimate objective or whether it 
must be necessary to achieve the legitimate objective. The second variant would be the 
stricter one, demanding that without the sporting rule (or its intended change) the legitimate 
objective would be failed. In many cases, in particular when addressing rules changes, the 
‘new’ rule may fail to be necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in the sense that the 
‘old’ rule did so, too. However, the ‘new’ rule may improve the spectacle with the same 
degree of objective achievement. Still, this rules change would be considered an infringement 
under the ‘necessary’ interpretation of ‘inherent’. In contrast, the first interpretation offers 
considerably more leeway for sports associations’ business strategies since all rules ‘suited’ to 
achieve the legitimate objective do not infringe competition rules. From a business 
perspective, the ‘suited’ interpretation of ‘inherent’ might be advantageous because it is 
neutral to the historical chronology of sporting rules design whereas the ‘necessary’ 
interpretation tends to cement the ‘original’ rule. 

16 In the ‘ordinary’ industry, establishing the existence of a dominant position is a difficult and usually 
controversial task. 
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Eventually, the ‘proportionate’ condition (2c) demands the competition restriction by the 
sporting rule to be not more restrictive than necessary and applied in a transparent, objective 
and non-discriminatory manner. 
Step 3: Does the rule fulfil the exemption conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU or does an 
objective justification make it compatible with Article 102 TFEU?  
As outlined in section 2.1, an infringement of Article 101 (1) TFEU can be exempted from 
prohibition if five criteria are fulfilled (see there). Likewise, an infringement of Article 102 
TFEU can be compatible with competition if an objective justification exists. So, even if a 
sporting rule is not inherent in the organisation or proper conduct of sport, it can be 
compatible with competition rules if a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive 
effects (according to the respective criteria of Article 101 (3) TFEU) comes to the conclusion 
that the beneficial (procompetitive) effects outweigh the restrictive effects.  
In line with the general trend in European competition policy, the Commission insists on a 
case-by-case analysis of each sporting rule in question. According to the Commission 
(European Commission 2007b: 69), it is neither possible to predetermine an exhaustive 
blacklist of anticompetitive sporting rules, nor to provide a whitelist of unproblematic 
sporting rules. The only source for this type of knowledge is previously decided cases and, 
naturally, they offer merely an accidental selection of rule types. The case-by-case approach 
offers the advantage of deciding each case on its own merits but the disadvantage of not 
providing much guidance for business behaviour. 
2.2.3. Business Practices of Sports Clubs and Associations 
Next to the internal regulation of sport and its intertwined business elements, there is an area 
where sports business conducts more ‘ordinary’ business behavior, namely buying and selling 
behavior. Here, competition rules generally apply in the ‘normal’ way, i.e. the special 
characteristics of sports usually do not play a role. Examples include the equipment buying 
behavior of individual sports clubs or their ticket selling practices as well as the competitive 
behavior of sports-related enterprises like equipment producers.17
So far, specific competition concerns have occurred in the context of sports events where the 
federation as the principal organizer has engaged in buying and selling behavior – namely the 
football world cups. More precisely, the ticketing arrangements for these events have been 
scrutinized and serve as the only source for principles in this area so far (European
Commission 2007b: 89-92). Basically, two different competition problems have been 
identified: (a) discriminatory sales systems (territorial restrictions for the 1998 World Cup) 
and (b) exclusivity contracts (travel agency exclusivity for travel-ticket packages to the 1990 
World Cup; credit card exclusivity for ticket payments in the 2004 Athens Olympic Games 
and the 2006 World Cup).  

17 Note that the sports-media interface is treated as a special issue in section 2.2.4. 
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Two principles can be inferred from these cases, namely (i) non-discrimination and (ii) 
reasonable access to tickets. In particular, the Commission insists that sufficient alternatives 
for access have to accompany any exclusive contract. For instance, credit card exclusivity 
requires the existence of either alternative payment methods (e.g. bank transfer) without 
dissuasive or prohibitive costs or alternative sales channels free of the exclusivity to one 
credit card company (e.g. exclusivity only for online sales; card freedom for over-the-counter 
sales). 
Whether these principles will guide possible decisions on other types of exclusivity contracts 
and whether they are appropriate or sufficient in this regard remains open. Especially, the 
increasing role of advertisement exclusivity contracts in the context of Olympic Games and 
World Cups (including the ever-increasing scope of the exclusivity) might be viewed to 
trigger future investigations and cases.
2.2.4. The Special Issue of Broadcasting Rights
Sport media rights are viewed to be a special issue by the Commission (European
Commission 2007b: 78-89; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 10-13) because of two reasons. Firstly, 
due to the extraordinary price increases especially of TV broadcasting rights, they are viewed 
to be one of the main factors driving the economic growth of the sports sector. Secondly, 
sports broadcasting rights are viewed to be an important input to media markets. In particular 
for (pay) television markets, certain broadcasting rights represent a premium content that has 
a decisive influence on the competitiveness of a media company. Consequently, the 
concentration of valuable media rights in the hands of very few sports federations limits their 
availability and cause competitive concerns for sports and media markets (Toft 2006: 3).
A typical phenomenon in sports business is the centralized marketing of a league or 
championship by the governing or regulatory body, a sports association. Next to creating a 
common brand, this centralized marketing strategy typically includes the bundling of the 
broadcasting rights in the hands of the association and the sale of these rights on behalf of the 
original rights holders (the participants, hosts and promoter of the league or championship). 
Centralized marketing represents a type of joint-selling and constitutes a restriction of 
competition under Article 101 (1) TFEU, namely a cartel (Toft 2006: 4-6; Kienapfel & Stein
2007: 11). In a league, for instance, it prevents the individual clubs from competing for 
television deals, often sets a uniform price (price-fixing), often reduces the number of 
available rights in order to increase the price (artificial output reduction), leads to market 
foreclosure in media markets, and can hamper the development of certain sub-markets (e.g. 
new media markets in order to protect pay-TV revenues). Insofar, considerable harm to 
consumer welfare must be expected. 
Next to the considerable anticompetitive effects of the centralized and bundled sale of 
broadcasting rights, the Commission also recognizes procompetitive efficiency effects, which 
11 

may potentially allow for an exemption according to Article 101 (3) TFEU. More precisely, 
the Commission identifies three types of benefits (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 11-12): 
- the creation of a single point of sale provides efficiencies by reducing transaction costs 
for clubs and media companies, 
- the creation of a common brand is efficient as it increases recognition and distribution 
of the product, and 
- the creation of a league product may increase its attractiveness for the fans (viewers) 
as the product is focused on the competition as a whole rather than the individual clubs 
participating in the competition. 
The Commission has taken a skeptical position as to whether these benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects. Following three case decisions, it has established the practice that it 
views the conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU (see section 2.1) fulfilled if a couple of 
‘remedies’ are implemented in the joint-selling arrangement (Toft 2006: 7-10; European
Commission 2007b: 84-89):
- competitive tendering, i.e. a non-discriminatory and transparent competitive bidding 
process in order to give all potential buyers an opportunity to compete for the 
broadcasting rights, 
- limitation of the duration of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. employing a ‘sun-setting 
mechanism’, according to the current Commission practice in football the duration 
must not exceed three seasons, 
- limitation of the scope of exclusive vertical contracts, i.e. unbundling media rights into 
several separate packages in order to prevent market foreclosure (sometimes combined 
with ‘blind-selling’), for instance, exclusive football live rights currently must be 
separated in at least two balanced and meaningful packages, 
- exclusion of conditional bidding, 
- fall-back option, use obligation and parallel exploitation in order to remedy output 
restrictions; i.e. unused rights fall back to the individual clubs for parallel, competitive 
exploitation,
- exceptionally: ‘no single buyer obligation’ in case of already existing dominance of 
one television operator, and 
- trustee supervision of the tender procedure. 
Within the area of broadcasting rights, the competition policy of the Commission is 
comparatively advanced. The conditions for centralized marketing concepts to fulfill the 
exemption criteria from the cartel prohibition are outlined in a rather clear-cut and 
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unambiguous way, providing appropriate guidance for business strategies of sports 
associations. 
3. The Practice of European Competition Policy in Sports Markets: Examples and 
Comments 
After having laid out the principles of antitrust interventions into sports business in Europe in 
the preceding sections, the paper now addresses additional implications from some concrete 
case decisions. In doing so, it gets clearer how the principles work. However, the line of 
reasoning also reveals some ambiguities in the principles and its application. Section 3.1 
provides examples of sporting rules that have been found to be pro- or anticompetitive in the 
case practice so far. Section 3.2 addresses the FIA case in some detail because it still is the 
landmark case regarding abuse of dominance by a sports association. Eventually, section 3.3 
briefly addresses three critical issues in the competition regulation of centralized marketing 
arrangements. 
3.1. Procompetitive and Anticompetitive Sporting Rules: Examples from the Case 
Practice 
Drawing on the existing case practices (see Appendix I), an indicative list of sporting rules 
that are likely to stand in line with competition rules and comply with Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU can be derived (European Commission 2007b: 70-73; Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 9). This 
list has to be viewed with some caution, however, since the assessment of a specific rule will 
depend on the concrete design and context under a case-by-case approach.
- Entry Rules (the Judo case): In order to manage the inherent limits to the number of 
participants in a tournament, championship or league, the competent sports 
associations needs to define selection criteria. As long as they are appropriate to the 
competition in question as well as non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory (e.g. 
following transparent performance criteria), entry-restricting rules are likely to meet 
the criteria legitimate objective, inherence and proportionality (see section 2.2.2). 
- ‘Home and Away’ Rule (Mouscron case): Leagues are often organized in home- and 
away-matches between clubs and defining a territorial restriction for ‘home’ is likely 
to stand in line with the Meca-Medina criteria. 
- Transfer Periods (Lehtonen case): Restriction of the time period through which 
players are allowed to change clubs (transfer windows) may follow the legitimate 
objective to ensure the regularity of competitions (absence of ‘artificial’ game-to-
game changes in the competitive strength of the teams by hiring and firing players). 
Inherence and proportionality sensitively depend on the concrete design of the transfer 
window.
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- Nationality Clauses for National Teams: inherent to a meaningful competition 
between national teams. 
- Multiple Ownership Rules: Rules preventing that two or more competitors in the same 
league, championship or tournament are owned or managed by the same company or 
person serve the legitimate objective to safeguard the uncertainty of outcome and the 
integrity of competition. 
- Anti-doping Rules (Meca-Medina case): Legitimate objectives here may be the 
integrity of competition and the protection of the health of the participants. Inherence 
and proportionality may depend on the specific design and context. 
In addition to these case related conclusions regarding procompetitive sporting rules, 
Kienapfel and Stein (2007: 9) refer to the “elementary rules of a sport (e.g. the rules fixing the 
length of matches or the number of players on the field)”. However, the category ‘elementary 
rules of the game’ will be as difficult to unambiguously delineate as the ‘purely sporting rule’ 
concept discarded by the ECJ.
In contrast, the following rules and regulatory areas are viewed to be examples of rules 
typically involving serious competition concerns (European Commission 2007b: 73-76; 
Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 9-10): 
- Deterrence of Competition Rules (the FIA case): Rules protecting commercial 
activities by sports associations from competition are typically anticompetitive (see 
also section 3.2). 
- Exclusive Internal Judiciary Systems (inter alia, FIA and FIFA case). Rules excluding 
legal challenges of decisions by sports associations before ordinary courts typically 
violate European antitrust rules. 
- Transfer Payment Systems (Bosman case): Payments for transfers of players may only 
be acceptable within narrow boundaries. In particular, mandatory transfer payments 
for out-of-contract players violate European competition and internal market rules. 
- Nationality Rules (Bosman case): Outside national teams’ tournaments, restrictions of 
participants on grounds of citizenship raise serious anticompetitive effects (and violate 
internal market rules if EU nationality is involved). 
- Restrictions of Professions Ancillary to Sport (the Piau case). Restrictions for players’ 
agents, for instance, must not be arbitrary, overly restrictive or otherwise 
anticompetitive. In the case in question, inter alia the requirement to deposit a bank 
guarantee in order to obtain an agent’s license from FIFA was assessed to be 
anticompetitive. 
Again, this list has to be dealt with caution since the assessment of a specific rule will depend 
on the concrete design and context under a case-by-case approach. Furthermore, the discussed 
rules represent only a small fraction of relevant rules in sports business. 
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3.2. Abuse of Regulatory Power: The FIA Case (1999 – 2003) 
Although the FIA case was handled considerably before the 2007 revision of the 
Commission’s competition policy towards sports business, it offers a couple of useful 
insights. The Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) is the principal worldwide 
authority for motor racing. Its members are national motor racing associations. Next to being 
a ‘governing’ sports associations setting and governing sporting regulations, the FIA also 
engaged in commercial promotion activities. This was viewed to create a conflict of interests 
that sets incentives for the FIA to abuse its regulatory power in order to protect and increase 
the commercial rents from its self-promoted products and, thus, discriminate against and deter 
products under its authority that are promoted by independent agencies. 
The Commission prima facie alleged the FIA to abuse its dominant position in the market for 
global motor racing series (‘world championships’) in four ways (European Commission
1999; Cygan 2007a: 80-86, 2007b: 1336-1341): 
I. the FIA used its power to block series which compete with its own events, 
II. the FIA has used this power to force a competing series out of the market, 
III. the FIA used its power abusively to acquire all the television rights to international 
motor sports events, and 
IV. FIA protect the Formula One (F1) Championship from competition by tying 
everything up that is needed to stage a rival championship. 
Allegations (I) and (IV) deal with the issue of deterring competitive threats to flagship 
championships of FIA by tying up the essential factors for organizing and promoting a rival 
series. More precisely, it refers to FIA’s contractual and licensing practices which usually 
included an exclusive commitment to the FIA series and threatened withdrawal of the 
participation right in FIA flagship championships in case of any engagement in rival series. 
For instance, contracts with circuit owners prevented circuits used for F1 Grand Prix races 
from being used for races that could compete with F1. The so-called Concorde Agreement
(the basic contract constituting the F1 world championship) prevented F1 teams from 
participating in any rival series and contracts with broadcasters included significant fines in 
case they broadcasted anything deemed by FIA’s commercial rights management to be a 
competitive threat. (II) refers to evidence that FIA abused its monopoly position as a regulator 
to force a competing promoter out of the market. The GTR organization had successfully 
promoted a sports car championship (Gran Turismo, GT), which – after driving them out of 
the market by denying access to circuits, drivers, teams, etc. – then was replaced by a similar 
championship under FIA promotion (FIA GT Championship). Hence, the double role of FIA 
(and its associated companies) as a monopoly regulator and a competitor in the promoter 
market played an important role. Allegation (II) refers to a new FIA rule from 1995 claiming 
the television rights to all motor sports events under its authority. This implied that promoters 
competing with FIA (and its associated companies) were forced to assign the television rights 
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to their competitor (which was also the regulatory monopolist). In economic terms, the 
allegations against FIA rested on (i) exclusive contracts including prohibitive sanctions with 
essential factors of production as well as (ii) leveraging the monopoly power from being the 
governing sports association into the promoter market. Both anticompetitive conducts 
constitute an abuse of dominance and a violation of European antitrust rules (in modern 
connotation Article 102 TFEU).  
Furthermore, the Commission criticized the internal decision making and appeal procedures 
of FIA, in particular with respect to a lack of transparency. The exclusion of ordinary courts 
for appeals against FIA decisions was also downturned. 
Eventually, and in order to heal the anticompetitive effects, the European Commission
(2001b; Cygan 2007a: 86-88, 2007b: 1341-1343) established that FIA must
I. establish a complete separation of the commercial and regulatory functions in relation 
to the FIA Formula One World Championship and the FIA World Rally 
Championship;  
II. improve transparency of decision making and appeals procedures and create greater 
accountability;
III. guarantee access to motor sport to any person meeting the relevant safety and fairness 
criteria;
IV. guarantee access to the international sporting calendar and ensure that no restriction is 
placed on access to external independent appeals; 
V. modify the duration of free-to-air broadcasting contracts in relation to the FIA 
Formula One World Championship with a maximum duration of three years (reduced 
from five years). 
Fundamentally, the Commission’s remedies focus on two issues: (i) unbundling the tying in 
of all relevant factors necessary to organize a motor racing championship by breaking up the 
exclusivity contracts and by enjoining the related contractual penalties, and (ii) separating the 
regulatory management of the prime world championships from the commercial management 
in order to demotivate any conflict of interest.  
Reducing the scope for discriminating exclusivity contracts represents a somewhat ‘ordinary’ 
limitation of the strategic options of enterprises with strong market dominance – like, for 
instance, in the famous Microsoft case – and as such is rather unproblematic. The new 
methodology (see section 2.2.2) would not have changed the assessment since this type of 
long-run discriminating exclusivity contracts with prohibitive contractual penalties can hardly 
be viewed to be inherent to organizing a world championship in four-wheel motor racing. 
Next to violating the inherence principle, the massive restrictions of the strategic business 
freedom of circuit owners, teams, manufacturers and drivers additionally fails to respect the 
proportionality principle. 
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The more difficult part of the Commission’s decision in this respect refers to the underlying 
objective of FIA’s contractual policy. Does the prevention of a rival series represent a 
legitimate or an illegitimate objective for a governing sports association? In the FIA case, the 
Commission clearly views the deterrence of a rival series to the FIA Formula One World 
Championship to be anticompetitive (Cygan 2007a, 2007b) and, thus, implicitly to represent 
an illegitimate objective. However, Commission acknowledges that the specificities of sport 
include the acceptance of the ‘monopolistic pyramid structure’ of sports organization and the 
need for an umbrella cooperation of all participants in terms of regulation and the creation of 
a single-entity championship, league or tournament (see section 2.2.1). Furthermore, when 
assessing the competitive effects of centralized marketing, the Commission puts weight on the 
efficiency effects from having one single top-tier league, championship or tournament (see 
sections 2.2.4 and 3.3). Nowhere in the football cases, for instance, the Commission asks for 
opening up the structures for a rival championship, neither in terms of regulatory management 
nor in terms of commercial management. Unfortunately, the issue of the benefits and 
deficiencies of rival championships on the premium level of sports has not received much 
attention in the sports economics and management research literature. Four-wheel motor 
racing offers an illustrative example why such a research would warrant some effort. Probably 
in contrast to established ball sports disciplines, the question of what constitutes a rival series 
is not that obvious in motor racing. Does an open wheel single-seater cars world 
championship compete with a sports cars world championship? And the latter with a touring 
car world championship? Does the American-based but internationally expanding Indycar 
series (another open wheel single-seater format) represent a competitive threat to Formula 
One? What about sprint vs. endurance race formats? Do the feeder categories GP2, GP3, 
Renault World-Series, Formula Two, Formula 3 Euroseries, Auto GP, IndyLights, Formula 
Nippon, etc. compete with each other and belong to the same market? Interesting market 
definition issues surface that prevent a trivial answer to the legitimacy question of the 
association’s objective of preventing a ‘rival’ series.18
This non-trivial issue leads over to the second prerogative of the Commission’s intervention 
into motor racing, namely the separation of regulatory management and commercial 
management. For instance, Cygan (2007a: 89-92) remains skeptical whether the 
Commission’s intervention has brought a substantial change in television rights policy. The 
Commission’s obligations were implemented by (i) separating FIA (regulatory agency) and 
FOA (Formula One Administration Ltd.; commercial management) for the then-running 
Concorde Agreement (until 2008). Bernie Ecclestone, effectively controlling FOA (European
Commission 2001a: 169/5), stepped down as a FIA Vice-President in order to dissolve the 
personal inter-linkage as well.19 Furthermore, FIA and the Formula One Group (FOG; CEO: 

18 The comparatively few treatments in sports economics and management highlight the benefits of a league or 
championship monopoly (inter alia, Fort & Quirk 1997; Rascher 2010: 29-34; cf. Ross 1989: 733-753) – but 
without exploring the difficult market definition issue that may emerge outside the usual football-baseball-
basketball analyses. 
19 Bernie Ecclestone, nevertheless, became a member of the all-important FIA World Motor Sport Council as a 
‘team representative’. 
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Bernie Ecclestone20), draw up a 100 year contract handing the commercial rights for the FIA 
Formula One World Championship exclusively to FOG from 2010-2110 (European 
Commission 2006: 3). This new construction was accepted by the Commission following a 
monitoring period (European Commission 2003b). According to Cygan (2007a, 2007b), the 
‘new’ commercial rights holder basically continues the previous policies. In particular, the 
low revenue participation of teams and other stakeholders via the Concorde Agreement is 
continuing or has only very modestly improved. Cygan (2007a: 89-93) further conjectures 
that substantially nothing has changed regarding the common interest of regulatory authority 
(FIA) and commercial promoter (FOA/FOG) to prevent the establishment of a rival series to 
F1. Insofar, the separation of genuine sporting regulation and commercial management 
appears to be void in hindsight. Cygan (2007a: 91, 93) refers to the example of the 2006 
manufacturers breakaway series threat, motivated predominantly by the low revenue shares 
from the commercial revenue of marketing F1. “It is no coincidence that, in March 2006, new 
safety regulations, improved provisions for revenue distribution between the teams and the 
sale of the commercial rights for 2008 onwards were all concluded at a time when FIA was 
seeking to avoid a competitor series being established. These arrangements will compose the 
new Concorde Agreement which the teams have signed in September 2006 to participate in 
Formula One beyond this date” (Cygan 2007a: 93). The breakaway controversy between the 
team organization FOTA (Formula One Teams Association) on the one side and FIA & FOG 
on the other side offers another prime example – and, again, the establishment of a rival series 
was successfully deterred. 
From today’s perspective, it appears to be somewhat doubtful whether the enforced separation 
of commercial management and governing authority stands in line with the post-2007 sports 
competition policy of the Commission. And even before that the Commission took a different 
stance with respect to European football where it confirmed a neutral position towards the 
organization of commercial management within or outside the regulatory sports associations 
(Toft 2006: 6-7). From a competition economics perspective, a 100 year contract handing the 
commercial rights monopoly to a private profit-oriented company might actually raise more 
competition concerns than a the conflict of interests that the Commission (probably 
ineffectively) tried to eliminate. It is certainly difficult to see why FOG should behave under 
more effective competitive pressure than FIA-FOA pre-2001. However, the influence of the 
share- and stakeholders of Formula One on the exploitation and utilization of the commercial 
rights revenues has considerably decreased. 
3.3. Centralized Marketing: the European Football Cases 
There have been three cases so far where the Commission has dealt with the centralized 
marketing of sports media rights by football associations. The first one was the UEFA 
Champions League case in 2003, the second one the English Premier League case (2002 – 

20 http://www.cvc.com/Content/EN/OurCompanies/CompanyDetails.aspx?PCID=737; retrieved 2010-12-12 at 
15.31. 
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2004) and the third one the Bundesliga case in 2005. While the handling and the decision of 
these football-related cases demonstrate a coherent and comparably clear-cut policy (see 
section 2.2.4), three interesting issues surface at a closer look: (i) the economic reasoning of 
the efficiency effects, (ii) the comparison to the treatment of centralized marketing in other 
sports disciplines, and (iii) the coherence with exemplary decisions by Member State 
authorities. Due to space limitations, these aspects can only be sketched in the context of this 
paper. However, this suffices for demonstrating that the framework for media rights selling 
strategies of sports associations may not be so unambiguous as it appears on first sight (see 
section 2.2.4). 
3.3.1. Economic Reasoning 
The economic reasoning of the Commission regarding the efficiencies justifying an 
exemption of centralized marketing arrangements (following the conditions outlined in 
section 2.2.4) embraces one interesting line of argument and interestingly dismisses another 
one. The single-point-of-sale argument appears to embrace an unorthodox transaction cost 
concept at first sight. Indeed, having a monopoly supplier reduces transaction costs in the 
sense that costs of searching and selecting disappear. It would be a mistake in economic 
reasoning, however, to confuse ‘minimum transaction costs’ with ‘efficiency’. Competition 
involves necessary transaction costs since it creates product and service diversity, allocative 
efficiencies as well as innovation and technological change. All these factors, however, 
improve consumer welfare despite the generated transaction costs – consumer welfare both in 
terms of lower prices and a consumer-preferences-driven evolution of the product and the 
related services. Thus, arguing that a single point of sale provides efficiencies due to the 
reduction of transaction costs is a nonsense argument from a competition economics 
perspective and a dangerous reasoning. 
However, the Commission (European Commission 2007b: 83) argues a bit different. “The 
single point of sale enabled the acquisition of coverage for the whole UEFA Champions 
League season, allowing programming to be planned in advance. (…) [D]ue to the knock-out 
nature of the UEFA Champions League (…) a broadcaster could not know in advance which 
clubs would make it through to the end.” A decentralized sale of broadcasting rights, thus, 
would imply that the value of individually sold broadcasting rights “would plummet if that 
club was eliminated” (see additionally European Commission 2003a: rec. 139-153). This 
reasoning emphasizes the knock-out character (cup system) of the UEFA Champions League 
(European Commission 2003a: rec. 145). And, indeed, the coverage of a whole cup is 
impossible to be sold in advance with a decentralized system since nobody knows in advance 
who will survive the knock-out rounds.21 However, two critical implications must be 
remarked. Firstly, this is true only for cup systems – and not for the English Premier League 
or the Bundesliga. Consequently, the efficiency reasoning would have to be different and 
‘weaker’ for pure league systems than for such involving knock-out elements (cup systems, 
play-off elements, etc.). This is not reflected in the Commission’s decision practice. Secondly, 

21 In addition, the Commission (2003a, rec. 146) claims that joint selling arrangements are necessary to allow 
for comprehensive highlights programs of match-days. 
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it is not clear why the complete coverage must be sold in advance of the season – and cannot 
be offered in sequences corresponding to the knock-out rounds. Selling all the rights in 
advance of the championship may follow a legitimate objective merely if it is inherent to 
create a common brand (insofar as this represents a legitimate objective). Then, however, the 
creation of an otherwise not available commonly-branded and coherent league product 
represents the efficiency effect and reference to single-point-of-sale or (strange) transaction-
cost reasoning is not necessary since it does not add consumer welfare beyond the branding 
issue. 
The economic reasoning of the Commission does not employ the competitive balance 
improvement reasoning as a justification for exempting centralized marketing arrangements 
under an Article 101 (3) TFEU assessment (Kienapfel & Stein 2007: 12).22 This seems to be 
surprising at first sight since it belongs to the ‘textbook wisdoms’ of sports economics and 
management that striving for more competitive balance represents a legitimate task of any 
sports association (Rottenberg 1956; Fort & Quirk 1995; Groot 2008; Fort 2010: 155-199). 
Moreover, revenue-sharing may be a prime instrument in reducing competitive imbalance and 
centralized marketing arrangements offer avenues to distribute the centralized collected 
television revenues among the league participants in a way to promote competitive balance. In 
order to advocate the competitive balance defense, it is further necessary to point at the 
benefits for consumers (fans) due to a more balanced sporting competition. 
The reluctance of the Commission to embrace the competitive balance defense as a 
justification for antitrust exemptions, on the other hand, corresponds to a growing skepticism 
in the sports-economics literature, casting doubt on the interrelation of ‘more balance’ and 
‘more attractiveness’ (Peeters 2009; Pawlowski et al. 2010) as well as on the pro-balance 
incentive for league managers (Szymanski 2006) or even dismissing the competitive balance 
justification in total (Mehra & Zuercher 2006; Massey 2007). Still, given the comparatively 
considerable weight that U.S. antitrust authorities are putting behind the competitive balance 
defense, it seems surprising that it did not play a role in the Commission decisions.  
3.3.2. Centralized Marketing in Different Sports Disciplines 
Regarding the look beyond football, it is interesting, that the Commission accepted 
centralized marketing of broadcasting rights without considerable obligations (like 
competitive tendering, segmentation of rights, trustee supervision, etc.) in Formula One motor 
racing. This stands in sharp contrast to the football-related decisions – and although it can be 
reasoned that it simply was an older decision, it remains remarkable that the Commission did 
not take this matter on the agenda again in the light of the football decisions. 
According to Cygan (2007a: 88), the Commission factually acknowledges with its decision 
that motor racing is different from football in the sense that motor sport viewers are interested 
in the chronological development of the championship throughout the season rather than in 

22 “The Commission nevertheless considers that it is not necessary for the purpose of this procedure to consider 
the solidarity argument any further.” (European Commission 2003a: rec. 167; see also rec. 164-167). 
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individual races. Regarding football, he conjectures the opposite, referring to the typical 
football fans’ loyalty to one team. Thus, football fans are alleged to be less interested in the 
unfolding of the championship and more in single, isolated games. In other words, while the 
Formula One World Championship is viewed to be one single event (and not consisting of 
individual races as single events), a football league is viewed to consist of individual games as 
single events. Such a reasoning might have some appeal with a view to the European 
Champions League (albeit a bit stuck in the philosophy of the older European cups). 
However, it appears to be rather doubtful that the English Premier League or the German 
Bundesliga are less of an entity than the Formula One World Championship.23
Regarding the institutional framework for doing business, sports associations and its members 
should be aware that the clear guiding principles of section 2.2.4 appear to be applicable only 
for ball sports leagues and can not necessarily be transcribed to other sports disciplines or 
other types of championships and tournaments. 
3.3.3. A Member State Curiosity? 
Eventually, the 2008 Bundesliga centralized marketing ‘case’ of the German Federal Cartel 
Office (FCO) serves as illustrative example for another tendency in marketing- and 
management-relevant competition policy practices in Europe. It is, however, not a formal 
decision case. Instead, the German football league (DFL; Deutsche Fußball Liga) submitted 
the plans for its centralized marketing concept for the seasons 2009 onwards in advance for 
scrutiny to the FCO. The FCO objected the submitted model and laid out detailed conditions 
for a rule-conformal design (Bundeskartellamt 2208; Heitzer 2008). While most of the 
reasoning does not add to the preceding discussion of the Commission decisions, one aspect 
stands out. The FCO put a lot of emphasis behind the importance of offering comprehensive 
highlights programs of match-days (see also above footnote 20). A prompt comprehensive 
highlights program broadcasted via free TV is viewed to limit the prices that Pay TV can 
charge the fans for live broadcasting. Disestablishing this type of program would harm 
consumer welfare by (i) eliminating the choice between two different product variants (pay 
television live broadcasting vs. free television comprehensive highlights program with a 
sufficiently small time delay) and (ii) increasing prices for pay television costumers (Heitzer
2008: 4). The FCO concludes that giving consumers (fans) a fair share of the centralized 
marketing benefit requires the existence of free TV highlights programs broadcasted promptly 
after the matches have been played. This conclusion leads to detailed discussion of how to 
schedule the matches between Friday to Sunday and the possible time slots of the related free 
TV highlights programs for the first and second division of German professional football. 
Inter alia, the FCO demanded (i) the maintenance of a core match-day (on Saturday) and (ii) 
prompt highlights programs in free TV. For instance, the core match-day on Saturdays (at 
least five out of nine matches per match-day; 15.30 – 17.15 o’clock) must be available for 
such a free TV comprehensive highlights program before 20.00 o’clock because such a 

23 Note also that historically the Formula One World Championship and its predecessors developed from the 
idea of combining the most important Grand Prix races of a year into a championship classification. In this 
regard, a Grand Prix is much more a single event than one football match. 
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program during prime time (20.00 – 22.00 o’clock) is deemed to be unprofitable and a late 
night highlights program (after 22.00 o’clock) is assessed to be consumer-welfare harming 
(Bundeskartellamt 2008: 6-9; Heitzer 2008: 5-6). 
Without going into an analysis of the economic sense of these requirements, the interesting 
thing is the degree of detail of the intervention by the FCO. At the end of the day, the FCO 
and the DFL – in detail – negotiated about the time slots for the matches, the allocation of the 
matches over the weekend and the timing of different types of television coverage. It can 
hardly be the task of a competition authority enforcing competition rules to engage in such a 
detail regulation of management issues. However, this – admittedly extreme – example stands 
in line with the tendency of competition policy in Europe to negotiate ‘deals’ with the norm 
addressees and reach consensual solutions (commitments, settlements and remedies). This 
tendency is favored by the case-by-case approach, i.e. departing from a rule-based policy and 
moving towards detail-assessments of each single case. While this may involve disadvantages 
for the enforcement power of competition policy (Budzinski 2010), it offers sports 
associations, clubs and related enterprises the option to reach favorable agreements with the 
competition authorities. 
4. Conclusion 
The competition rules and policy framework of the European Union represents an important 
institutional restriction for doing sports business. Driven by the courts, the 2007 overhaul of 
the approach and methodology has increased the scope of competition policy towards sports 
associations and clubs. Nowadays, virtually all activities of sports associations that govern 
and organize a sports discipline are subject to antitrust rules. This includes genuine sporting 
rules that are essential for a league, championship or tournament to come into existence as 
well as ‘real’ business or commercial activities like ticket selling, marketing of broadcasting 
rights, etc. The main management implication is that sports organizing bodies need to 
consider the institutional framework defined by European competition rules when shaping 
their strategies and setting rules. Many rules and strategies that used to be outside antitrust 
considerations, like qualification schemes for championships or licensing systems for 
participants on all levels, and, therefore, could be freely shaped and designed, are now 
required to comply with a defined test. In summary, regulatory activities of sports associations 
comply with European competition rules if they pursuit a legitimate objective, its restrictive 
effects are inherent to that objective and proportionate to it (see section 2.2.2). This ‘new’ 
approach offers important orientation for the strategy choice of sports associations, clubs and 
related enterprises. However, the European Commission does not provide neither a blacklist 
of anticompetitive sporting rules nor a whitelist of procompetitive ones. Instead, each rule is 
assessed following a case-by-case approach as soon as complaints about the specific rule are 
notified to the Commission – or the attention of the Commission is turned to that rule by any 
other way. This implies that many rules that are in existence and proper use for years can 
actually stand in violence with European competition rules and as soon as a respective case 
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comes up, the responsible sports association may find itself in the unwanted role of an 
antitrust violator. Consequently, rule-setting bodies in all sports and on all sports levels need 
to exercise a self-evaluation of their sporting rules – both regarding existing ones and 
regarding new ones – according to the test described in this paper (see section 2.2.2). 
Additional conclusions can be drawn from the existing case decisions (see section 3.1 and 
3.2).
With respect to business activities, the focus of European competition policy is on centralized 
marketing arrangements bundling media rights. These constitute cartels and are viewed to be 
anticompetitive in nature. However, they may be exempted from the cartel prohibition on 
efficiency and consumer benefits considerations. Here, a detailed list of conditions exists that 
centralized marketing arrangements must comply with in order to be legal (see section 2.2.4). 
Although this policy seems to be well-developed at first sight, a closer look at the decision 
practice reveals several open problems (see section 3.3). Other areas of the buying and selling 
behavior of sports associations and related enterprises are considerably less well-developed 
and do not provide much orientation for business (see section 2.2.3). 
Eventually, the increasing importance of competition rules and policy for sports business is 
not yet reflected in the academic literature. In particular, economic analyses of the compliance 
of different types of (more or less genuine) sporting rules with the EC’s post-2007 assessment 
methodology as well as economic analyses focusing on other (‘European’) sports than 
football are lacking. Consequently, the existing research predominantly displays a legal-
science focus and the implication for sports marketing and management strategies have been 
neglected so far. This paper entails a first contribution to filling this gap but more research is 
necessary, in particular analyses that inquire when sporting rules and sports business 
strategies beyond the few examples in section 3 comply with the tests and rules laid out here. 
Since different sports associations run very different rule systems and strategies, case-specific 
in-depth analyses are required in order to overcome the uncertainty regarding the pro- or 
anticompetitive character of doing sports business in Europe. 
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Appendix: List of EU Sports Cases 
Case classification:  
(I) the internal regulation of sport (genuine sporting rules or the rules of the game), 
(II) business practices (buying and selling behavior of sports enterprises, like ticketing arrangements, 
exclusivity contracts, etc),  
 (III) the sale of broadcasting rights (in particular the practice of bundling and joint-selling of the 
rights and the centralized marketing of a league or a championship), and 
(IV) mergers. 
Case Year Sports Type Policy Area / 
Body
Decision 
Walrave 1974 general I, II  internal 
market rules / 
ECJ
(i) sports is 
subject to 
community law 
only if it 
constitutes a 
business activity, 
(ii) composition 
of national teams 
is not subject to 
nationality 
antidiscrimination 
rules
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Donà-Mantero 1976 Football I / exclusivity of 
national players in 
team sports 
internal
market rules / 
ECJ
prohibition 
Eurovision 1989 - 
1993 
all III / internal 
provisions on the 
acquisition,
exchange and 
contractual access to 
sports programs 
cartel policy; 
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance with 
obligations
World Cup 1990 
Italy
1992 Football II / package tours abuse control / 
Commission 
infringement; no 
fines
Tretorn Tennis 
Ball Suppliers 
1994 Tennis II / export ban on 
tennis balls 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
infringement; 640 
000 ECU fines 
(geographical
market division) 
Bosman 1995 Football I / transfer rules and 
payments; limitation 
to the number of 
foreign players 
internal
market rules, 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
prohibition of (i) 
transfer fees for 
out-of-contract 
players, (ii) limit 
to the number of 
EU players24
FIFA Sports 
Goods
1995 - 
2000 
Football I / standardization 
(technical
specifications) of 
footballs and 
licensing of 
products 
cartel policy, 
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance 
Deliège 1996 - 
2000 
Judo I / selection and 
participation rules 
internal
market rules, 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
clearance 
(necessary for the 
functioning of the 
underlying 
championship) 
Lehtonen 1996 – 
2000 
Basketball I / transfer rules, 
esp. deadline for 
transfers (transfer 
windows)
internal
market rules, 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
allowed subject to 
conditions (only 
if necessary for 
the functioning of 
the underlying 
championship) 

24 Confirmed in the Deutscher Handballbund (2003) and Simutenkov (2005) cases. 
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Danish Tennis 
Federation
1998 Tennis II / sponsorship 
agreements between 
sports associations 
and sports goods 
suppliers
cartel policy, 
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
World Cup 1998 
France 
1998 - 
1999 
Football II / ticket sales 
arrangements 
abuse control / 
Commission 
prohibition; 
discriminatory 
practices (unfair 
conditions for non-
French residents)
Mouscron Case 1999 Football I / ‘home and away’ 
rule
internal
market and 
competition 
rules / ECJ 
clearance 
FIA  1999 – 
2001 
Motor
Racing
I, II, III / deterrence, 
rival series and 
promoters, 
marketing systems, 
commixture of 
sports rules and 
business practices 
abuse control, 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments; 
monitoring until 
2003 
UEFA Euro 
2000 
2000 Football II / ticketing 
arrangements 
abuse control / 
Commission 
approval 
UEFA
Broadcasting
Regulations
2000 - 
2001 
Football III / blocking of live 
broadcasting;
protecting
attendance of lower-
level (amateur) 
leagues
cartel policy / 
Commission 
out of scope 
UEFA Multiple 
Ownership
2000 - 
2002 
Football I / prohibition of 
multiple ownership 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
out of scope 
(integrity of 
sporting
competition) 
UEFA
Champions 
League
2001 - 
2003 
Football III / joint-selling cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
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Meca-Medina 2001 – 
2006 
Swimming; 
Olympic 
Games 
I / anti-doping rules abuse control, 
cartel policy, 
free movement 
/ CFI, ECJ 
clearance  
FIFA Transfer 
Rules
2002 Football I / transfer rules internal 
market rules; 
abuse control / 
Commission 
investigation
closed after 
commitments 
FAPL English 
Premier League  
2002 - 
2006 
Football III / joint-selling cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
Bayerische 
Landesbank / 
Formula One 
Group 
2002, 
2005 
Motor
Racing
IV / acquisition of 
commercial rights 
holder (initially together 
with JP Morgan Chase and 
Lehman Brothers)
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance 
Athens Olympic 
Games 2004  
2003 Olympic 
Games 
II / credit card 
exclusivity
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
Bridgepoint / 
SVL / Holmes 
Place 
2003 Fitness IV / merger between 
fitness studio chains 
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance 
Newscorp / 
Telepíu (merger 
case involving 
SkyItalia) 
2003 Football IV merger control 
/ Commission 
sports
broadcasting
rights only one 
among many 
issues; main 
problem: 
insolvency-
preventing
merger  
DFB German 
Bundesliga
2003 - 
2005 
Football III / marketing 
system 
cartel policy / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments 
Cinven / BC 
Funds / Fitness 
First
2003, 
2005 
Fitness IV / acquisition of 
an international 
fitness studio chain 
(first by Cinven, later by BC 
Funds)
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance 
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Sportfive / HSG 
/ Stadion 
Frankfurt 
2004 Sports 
Facilities
IV / merger between 
sports marketing 
and sports facility 
operating companies
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance 
FIA / Vega 
Tyres 
2004 Motor 
Racing
I / tyres regulation; 
establishing of a 
single tyre supplier 
for karting series 
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance 
Piau 2005 Football II / licensing rules 
for sports related 
services (here: 
players agents) 
abuse control, 
cartel policy, 
internal
market rules / 
Commission, 
CFI, ECJ 
clearance after 
commitments 
(only objective 
and transparent 
licensing systems 
are allowed)  
World Cup 2006 
Germany  
2005 Football II / credit card 
exclusivity
abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance with 
commitments  
CVC / SLEC  2006 Motor 
Racing
IV / acquisition of 
FIA Formula One 
commercial rights 
holder
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance with 
conditions and 
obligations
Bridgepoint / 
Dorna
2006 Motor 
Racing
IV / acquisition of 
the FIM MotoGP 
commercial rights 
holder 
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance 
MOTOE 2008 Motor 
Cycling 
II / business 
activities of non-
profit organizations 
abuse control
/ ECJ/
European
competition rules 
are applicable; 
national rules 
cannot preclude 
this
Colony Capital / 
Morgan Stanley 
/ Colfilm 
2008 Football IV / Colfilm is 
holding company of 
Paris Saint-Germain 
Football SA 
merger control 
/ Commission 
clearance 
French Tennis  2009 Tennis I / anti-doping rules abuse control / 
Commission 
clearance 
Daimler / IPIC / 2009 Motor IV / engine supplier 
of several teams 
merger control clearance 
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Brawn GP Racing acquires leading 
racing team 
/ Commission 
Olympique Lyon 2010 Football I / transfer 
payments, 
compensation for 
young player 
education
Internal
market rules / 
ECJ
prohibition if 
compensation is 
unrelated to 
actual costs of 
training 
Sources: own compilation of data from 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/case_law.html and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/sports/decisions.html; retrieved 2011-01-24, 10:21. 
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